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While there has been a considerable literature exploring determinants of antitrust 
enforcement in the United States, studies have been based either on aggregate federal 
enforcement data over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, 
usually for a single year or aggregated over several years.  What has never been 
investigated is the pattern of state-level antitrust.  This is somewhat surprising, as this has 
been a major activity of many state Attorneys General.  In this paper, we explain state 
antitrust enforcement across states and time (for a 15-year period), examining a number 
of economic and political determinants which have been proposed in the literature. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
  While there is a large literature exploring determinants of antitrust enforcement in 
the United States, these studies have either been based on aggregate federal enforcement 
data over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, usually for a 
single year or aggregated over several years.  What has never been investigated is the 
pattern of state-level antitrust.  This is somewhat surprising, as this has been a major 
activity of many state Attorneys General.  This also allows for a much larger dataset, 
especially if the time dimension is explored.  In this paper, we explain state antitrust 
enforcement across states and time (for a 15-year period), examining a number of 
economic and political determinants which have been proposed in the literature. 
  Many explanations have been offered for antitrust enforcement, with a pure public 
interest perspective emphasizing the response to monopoly welfare losses, and more 
modern economic theories of regulation focusing on political variables and the extent to 
which cyclical patterns influence activity at the federal level through their impact on the 
interests of affected parties.  In our empirical analysis, we hypothesize that state level 
antitrust enforcement is a result of both local political and economic influences.  
  In what follows we utilize data from the Antitrust Multistate Litigation Database 
developed by the National Association of Attorneys General to explain state antitrust 
enforcement activity.  Our dataset includes antitrust enforcement for all 50 states for the 
period 1992-2006, giving us a pooled sample size of 750 observations.  Using a random-
effects Poisson regression model, we estimate to what degree various factors explain the 
number of antitrust cases filed by each state in a given year.   2
  We find strong evidence that a number of political and economic factors are 
significant determinants of the level of state antitrust enforcement.  For example, states 
with larger economies or larger government expenditures tend to file more antitrust 
enforcement cases than smaller states with more limited financial resources.  Antitrust 
enforcement at the state level tends to be countercyclical, increasing during periods of 
high unemployment in the state.  State attorneys general who are appointed to their 
position, or those serving under Republican governors, tend to file fewer antitrust actions 
than others. 
  In the next section we provide a brief review of the literature on the determinants 
of federal antitrust enforcement, followed by a discussion of recent trends in state level 
antitrust enforcement.  Section IV discusses the data and empirical model used in this 
study, while Section V presents our results.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  Previous Literature on Federal Enforcement 
  As discussed in Ghosal and Gallo (2001), there are two commonly cited 
justifications for antitrust enforcement.  First, antitrust laws may be used to correct for 
deviations from competitive behavior; these corrections increase consumer welfare at the 
expense of producers.  Second, interest groups may lobby for antitrust enforcement to 
redistribute wealth from one group (producers) to another (consumers or other – perhaps 
less efficient -- producers).   
Previous theoretical and empirical literature has explored the determinants of 
antitrust enforcement at the federal level both over time and across industries.  Besanko 
and Spulber (1989) and Harrington (2004) have provided theoretical models of optimal   3
enforcement, with the former focusing on enforcement costs and the need to “tolerate” 
some cartel activity given asymmetric information on production costs, and the latter 
noting that antitrust enforcement/detection will likely be a function of price changes 
(suggesting some perverse incentives enforcement provides to cartels).   
  For previous empirical studies of antitrust enforcement, sample sizes have tended 
to be quite small.   Long et al. (1973) examined 20 2-digit SIC industries and found 
industry sales to be the most important economic factor explaining antitrust filings, with a 
lesser influence of measures proxying for actual or potential monopoly power (such as 
profit margins, seller concentration, and estimated deadweight losses).  Siegfried (1975) 
disaggregated the analysis a bit to 65 IRS “minor industries” and concluded that 
economic variables generally seem to have little influence on Antitrust Division 
enforcement activity.    
Ghosal and Gallo (2001) performed a time series analysis on over 40 annual 
observations and found that antitrust enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice is 
countercyclical.  The authors speculate that this is because antitrust violations increase 
during periods of declining economic activity (as firms are more desperate to maintain 
profit levels).     
All studies note that political motivations obviously may play a role in 
enforcement (this is emphasized by Wood and Anderson (1993)), suggesting that in 
looking across states the incentives to file cases may be different for Attorneys General 
who are elected rather than appointed, and we explore this in the analysis below.  
Empirical studies of the national level of antitrust enforcement such as Areeda (1994) and   4
Ghosal and Gallo (2001) have investigated whether antitrust enforcement increases under 
Democratic administrations, with mixed results.  We examine this hypothesis as well. 
   
III.  State Antitrust Enforcement 
States increased their efforts to enforce federal and state antitrust laws in the mid-
1980s, a period in which, according to Rose (1994), state attorneys general were unhappy 
with the antitrust enforcement of the Reagan administration.
1  The National Association 
of Attorneys General (NAAG) created the Multistate Antitrust Task Force in 1983; this 
task force has developed state guidelines for enforcement of both vertical pricing 
restraints (in 1985) and horizontal mergers (in 1987, revised in 1993). 
As Rose (1994) states, the NAAG Guidelines “identify…antitrust’s central 
purpose [as] prevent[ing] income transfers from consumers to producers.”  The 
guidelines suggest that mergers be challenged almost entirely on the expected impact on 
the degree of competition in the market.   A recent report by the Antitrust Committee of 
the Section on Commercial and Federal Litigation of the New York State Bar (2003) 
suggests that many states consider the same factors in determining whether or not to 
become involved in an antitrust enforcement effort.
2  For example, states are most active 
in investigations in which local consumer interests are affected, including local price 
fixing, resale price maintenance, and mergers of firms that have direct contact with 
consumers (i.e. retailers).  The report also finds that states are particularly interested in 
matters impacting state agencies and purchases, like health-care services.  States also take 
                                                 
1 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 authorized state attorneys general to institute 
federal parens patriae actions for treble damages on behalf of their states’ consumers. 
2 The report was based on interviews with state antitrust officers in California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Maryland, New York, Texas and Wisconsin.   5
available resources into account; they are less likely to pursue matters that other 
government enforcers or private parties are prosecuting. 
The number of antitrust cases filed per year by individual states ranged from 0 to 
10 during the 1990 to 2006 period.  However, the level of enforcement activity varied 
considerably, both over time and across states.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the total 
number of state antitrust cases ranged from 9 cases in 2006 to 31 cases in 1994.   Figure 2 
illustrates the pattern of antitrust enforcement across states during the 1990 to 2006 
period.  Over half of state antitrust enforcement was undertaken by 6 states: New York, 
Florida, Texas, California, Washington, and Pennsylvania.  In contrast, 14 states filed 
zero antitrust cases during this time period.   
 
IV.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
Because most of the literature on the political economy of antitrust enforcement 
has concentrated on regulation at the national level, few researchers have considered 
what types of state level characteristics create cross-sectional variation in the level of 
enforcement.  We hypothesize that state level antitrust enforcement is a result of local 
political and economic influences, as detailed below.    
We expect that the larger the size of the state economy, as measured by the log of 
gross state product (GSP), the more antitrust enforcement undertaken by its attorney 
general.   States with larger governments may also engage in more antitrust enforcement 
for a number of reasons.  First, such states may have more financial resources available 
with which to pursue antitrust matters.  States with larger government may tend to be 
more interventionist in general.  Finally, states with large governments are likely large   6
purchasers within the state, thus may have more interest in pursuing antitrust matters.  
We include the state’s annual expenditures divided by its gross state product to account 
for these possibilities; this variable was calculated using data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s State Government Finances annual survey.    
One might expect that the larger the firms in the state, the more likely that the 
state would intervene in mergers or undertake other forms of regulation.  On the other 
hand, states may shy away from undertaking antitrust enforcement measures against 
large, politically powerful firms.  We account for either possibility using the proportion 
the state’s workers employed in “large” firms, which we define as those with more than 
250 workers.  This variable is calculated using data from the U.S. Census’ 1990 County 
Business Patterns in order to avoid potential endogeneity bias associated with including a 
current measure of concentration in an equation measuring antitrust enforcement.  To 
account for the possibility that antitrust enforcement is related to aggregate economic 
conditions (as noted by Ghosal and Gallo (2001)), we measure economic activity (or 
business cycles) in the state using the lagged annual average state unemployment rate 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
Because most state attorneys general are elected officials, state antitrust 
enforcement may be influenced by political party.  We include a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the governor of the state was a Republican during the majority of the year.
3  
Because the motivation for antitrust enforcement may be different for attorneys general 
who are elected rather than appointed, we also include a dummy variable for the five 
                                                 
3 We calculated this variable from information obtained from Congressional Quarterly’s Voting and 
Elections Collection.  We were unable to find data on the political party of all the state attorneys general 
during our sample period.   7
states that appoint their attorney general: Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire New Jersey 
and Wyoming.   
We include two final variables to capture characteristics of the state electorate.  
One theory of antitrust enforcement speculates that enforcement may be a method of 
allowing government agencies to redistribute wealth from producers to consumers.  If 
this is the case, we would expect antitrust enforcement to decrease with the state’s 
median household income, which we gathered from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.   
Finally, although labor unions are exempt from antitrust laws, we include the percentage 
of state workers that are members of unions to account for the possibility that unions may 
enact pressure on officials to secure antitrust enforcement on particular firms.  We 
measure unionization using the percentage of state workers that are members of unions as 
reported in the Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) Union Membership and Coverage 
Database.   
Summary statistics of all variables are included in Table 1.  In addition to the 
above variables, we include year dummy variables in all specifications in order to 
account for potential trends in state antitrust enforcement and macroeconomic conditions 
in the United States. 
As noted above, our dependent variable in the baseline specification is the number 
of antitrust cases, for a given state and year, in which the state was a lead plaintiff, which 
was gathered from the Antitrust Multistate Litigation Database developed by the National 
Association of Attorneys General.  This variable ranges from 0 to 10, thus we choose to 
estimate our empirical model using a random effects Poisson model.  In this model, the 
number of cases filed by state i in year t, yit, is modeled as a Poisson-distributed random   8
variable with mean λit.  The mean number of cases is a function of state-level 
characteristics, Xit, and a state-specific, gamma-distributed random error, ui, as described 
in the following equations: 
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  .    (1) 
The state-specific error accounts for both overdispersion in the data and serial 
dependence in the dependent variable within a state.  By assuming that the random error 
has a gamma distribution, the empirical model has a tractable density very similar to the 
negative binomial model that is typically used to estimate pooled count data that exhibits 
overdispersion.  We estimate the model using quadrature with 12 points of integration. 
  Specification tests suggest that the random-effects Poisson model is the most 
appropriate model for our data.  In particular, a regression-based version of the Hausman 
test of fixed versus random effects indicates that the random-effects model can be used to 
estimate our data.  Moreover, a Poisson goodness of fit test conducted on the pooled 
sample suggests that the Poisson distribution is more appropriate than a negative 
binomial distribution, which would account for potential overdispersion over and above 
the state-specific heterogeneity included in the random-effects Poisson model.
4 
  The number of cases filed by an individual state may decrease in a given year 
because of the economic and/or political conditions in the state (as partially captured in 
our explanatory variables), or because all states have chosen to participate in fewer 
antitrust actions due to changes in antitrust enforcement at the federal level or changes in 
the state antitrust guidelines set by NAAG, for example.  Figure 1 certainly suggests that 
there has been a downward trend in state antitrust enforcement since 1994.  In an 
                                                 
4 The p-value of this Hausman test was 0.1225.  The p-value of the Poisson goodness of fit test was 0.2433.   9
alternative specification, we use as our dependent variable the share of total state antitrust 
cases in which each state participated in as a lead plaintiff in a given year; this variable 
ranges from 0 to 0.555.  This dependent variable may better capture true cross-sectional 
determinants of state-level antitrust enforcement by taking into account the total number 
of state-level antitrust actions and the general trend in enforcement across states.   
  We estimate this model using a random-effects linear regression.  A Hausman test 
of fixed versus random effects again indicates that this is the most efficient way of 
estimating our data.
5  We also attempted to estimate the model using a random-effects 
Tobit model to account for the excess number of zeros in our data; the results were not 




  Parameter estimates from the random effects Poisson model are included in 
column 2 of Table 2.  A number of the variables that we hypothesized would impact the 
level of state antitrust enforcement proved to be significant and of the expected sign.  For 
example, larger states, as measured by the size of their state economy, tend to participate 
in more antitrust enforcement actions.  Parameter estimates suggest that a one percent 
increase in the gross state product increases the number of antitrust actions by almost one 
percent (e
.009-1).  States with larger government expenditures also tend to participate in 
more antitrust actions; a one percentage point increase in the size of the state’s total 
government expenditures relative to its gross state product increases the number of 
antitrust actions by the state by 14.8 percent.  We are unable to tell based on our data 
                                                 
5 The p-value of this Hausman test was 0.1360.   10
whether this is due to the fact that these states have more resources to pursue these 
matters, or because states with larger governments have more of an interest in antitrust 
violations. 
  As noted above some researchers have hypothesized that antitrust enforcement is 
countercyclical, at least at the federal level, because firms may engage in more illegal 
activity during periods of declining economic activity.  We find some evidence in support 
of this theory at the state level.  A one percentage point increase in the state’s lagged 
unemployment rate increases the number of antitrust actions filed by the state by 22.8 
percent.   
  Similarly, antitrust researchers at the federal level have suggested that antitrust 
enforcement will increase under democratic administrations and we find evidence to 
support this theory at the state level.  Attorneys general under Republican governors filed 
23.3 percent fewer antitrust actions than those under Democratic governors during our 
sample period.  Although we had no a priori belief regarding whether appointed attorneys 
general would pursue more antitrust violations than elected attorneys general, the 
parameter estimates suggest that appointed attorneys general participate in 90 percent 
fewer antitrust cases than their elected counterparts.   
  Finally, we hypothesized that states with poorer consumers may pursue more 
antitrust violations, thereby preventing additional income transfers from firms to 
consumers.  Instead, our parameter estimates suggest the opposite.  Specifically, we find 
that a one percent increase in a state’s median household income increases the number of 
antitrust actions they pursue by 2.6 percent.  Perhaps states with poorer households are 
more concerned with more direct ways of transferring resources back to these households   11
than antitrust actions.  We find no evidence that state level antitrust enforcement is 
impacted by either the union coverage rate or the share of workers employed by large 
firms.   
  The parameter estimates from the linear random effects regression in which the 
dependent variable is the share of total antitrust actions in which each state participated in 
a given year are presented in column 3 of Table 2.  The results are very similar to those of 
the count model regression.  For example, the share of total state antitrust enforcement 
undertaken by states with appointed attorneys general is, on average, 2.9 percentage 
points less than the share undertaken by states that elect their attorneys general.  
Similarly, the share of enforcement undertaken by attorneys general that serve under 
Republican governors is 0.6 percentage points less than those serving under Democratic 
governors. 
  Not surprisingly, the linear regression also finds strong evidence that larger states 
participate in more antitrust actions than those with smaller economies.  Our parameter 
estimates suggest that a one percent increase in the state’s gross state product increases 
the share of total state antitrust enforcement undertaken by that state by 0.021 percentage 
points. 
Although the sign of all the parameter estimates are identical to those in the 
Poisson regression, the statistical significance of some of the parameter estimates differs.  
For example, although the median household income, lagged unemployment rate and size 
of the state government were significant determinants of the number of cases filed by 
each state, they are insignificant determinants of the relative share of enforcement that 
each state chooses to participate in.     12
  This statistical insignificance is perhaps not surprising.  For example, all states 
may choose to file more antitrust actions during periods of slow economic growth, as 
measured by the lagged unemployment rate.  However, as poor economic conditions tend 
to be highly correlated across states, this variable is unlikely to be significant when trying 
to account for pure cross-sectional variation in the relative strength of antitrust 
enforcement across states.  
  In contrast, the share of workers employed at large firms is statistically significant 
in this model.  The parameter estimates suggest that states with larger firms file fewer 
antitrust actions compared to other states.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in 
the percentage of workers employed at firms with more than 250 workers reduces the 
share of state antitrust actions in which the state chooses to participate in by 0.1 
percentage points.  This seems to indicate that states tend to avoid taking antitrust actions 
against large, politically powerful firms.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
  State attorneys general have become important partners with the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in enforcing both 
federal and state antitrust laws.  However, this is the first empirical investigation of the 
determinants of their case-filing activity.   
In this study we have found that many of the explanations found in the literature 
on federal antitrust enforcement determinants also apply to state level enforcement.  For 
example, we find that antitrust enforcement at the state level tends to be countercyclical,   13
increasing during periods of high unemployment in the state.  State attorneys general who 
serve under Republican governors tend to file fewer antitrust actions than others.   
Other characteristics of state antitrust enforcement are specific to local area 
conditions.  For example, state attorneys general who are appointed to their position tend 
to file fewer antitrust actions.  States with larger economies and larger government 
expenditures file a greater number of antitrust actions than their smaller counterparts with 
fewer financial resources.   
None of this suggests that this case filing activity is optimal; however clearly 
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Figure 1 
Total State-Level Antitrust Litigation, 1990-2006 
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Figure 2 
Antitrust Litigation by State, 1990-2006 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Std.  Error  Minimum  Maximum 
Cases 0.549  1.140  0.000  10.000 
Ln(Gross State Product)  11.571  1.055  9.547  14.229 
Government Expenditures/GSP  0.127  0.034  0.069  0.296 
Share of Workers Employed at   
“Large” Firms 
0.583 0.167 0.178 0.825 
Unemployment Rate  0.050  0.014  0.023  0.113 
Republican 0.545  0.498  0.000  1.000 
Appointed 0.100  0.300  0.000  1.000 
Ln(Median Household Income)  10.800  0.159  10.325  11.194 
Union Coverage Rate  0.148  0.059  0.033  0.319 
   18
Table 2 










Ln(Gross State Product)  0.911**  0.027** 
 (0.214)  (0.006) 
Government Expenditures/GSP  13.820*  0.155 
 (6.432)  (0.138) 
Share of Workers Employed at      -1.639  -0.077** 
“Large” Firms  (1.437)  (0.033) 
Lagged Unemployment Rate  20.609**  0.248 
 (8.397)  (0.218) 
Republican -0.266**  -0.007* 
 (0.128)  (0.004) 
Appointed -2.304**  -0.026 
 (0.831)  (0.017) 
Ln(Median Household Income)  2.539**  0.022 
 (1.066)  (0.026) 
Union Coverage Rate  3.426  0.122 
 (3.269)  (0.079) 
    
δ  0.174  
 (0.278)   
σi   0.029 
σit   0.040 
    
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  750  750 
1 The dependent variable in the random effects Poisson model is the number of antitrust cases in which the 
state participated as a lead plaintiff in year t.  The dependent variable in the random effects linear 
regression is the share of total state antitrust enforcement in year t in which the state participated as a lead 
plaintiff.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** indicate those parameters significant at the 10 and 5 
percent levels, respectively.  Parameter estimates from the constant not reported. 